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SLAVES AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
THOMAS D. MORRIS*
"The negro, as a general rule, is mendacious . . 1
I
In 1853 William Goodell searingly observed that the slave "becomes
'a person' whenever he is to be punished!... He is under the control of
law, though unprotected by law, and can know law only as an enemy, and
not as a friend."' 2 Goodell's argument that slaves were outside the pro-
tection of the law rested upon two legal rules, one evidentiary and one
substantive. The substantive rule was the simple assertion, as made by
South Carolina's Judge John Belton O'Neall in State v. Maner, that the
slave was outside the protection of the common law. 3 The evidentiary
rule is another matter. Slaves could not testify against whites. As Chief
Justice Drewry Ottley of St. Vincent noted, the result of exclusion was
that "the difficulty of legally establishing facts is so great, that White men
are in a manner put beyond the reach of the law."'4 This was changed in
the West Indies during the 1820s as the British colonies inched toward
abolition. The whites would receive the testimony of slaves who could
show they were Christians and understood the significance of an oath.
Even then, there remained a vital exclusion: the testimony would be ex-
cluded if the white were on trial for his life. 5 No shift in policy occurred
in the American South. The wholesale exclusion remained in force to the
end of slavery.
A major change, however, did occur in the rules of evidence when
slaves had evidence to offer in cases involving free blacks and Indians.
Professor of History, Portland State University; B.A. 1960, M.A. 1965, Ph.D. 1969, Uni-
versity of Washington.
1. 1 THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 233 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1858).
2. WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: ITS DIs-
TINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND ILLUSTRATIVE FACTS
309 (Negro Universities Press 1969) (1853).
3. State v. Maner, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 453 (1834).
4. Quoted in ELSA V. GOVEIA, THE WEST INDIAN SLAVE LAWS OF THE 18TH CENTURY 31
(1970).
5. See, e.g., An Act to regulate the admission of the Evidence of Slaves, in 73 BRITISH PARLIA-
MENTARY PAPERS: SLAVE TRADE 39-40 (Irish University Press 1969) (1826).
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From the Revolution down to the 1820s the evidence of slaves began to
be admitted against such people of color in capital as well as non-capital
cases. Prior to that slaves could not testify in capital trials, although
there is evidence their testimony was received, even though reluctantly,
in non-capital cases. For instance, in Maryland as of 1717 the evidence
of slaves was received in cases against any black or Indian as long as it
was a case that did not involve depriving them "of Life or Member." At
the same time their testimony against "any Christian, White Person" was
excluded. 6
North Carolina was one of the first to expand the rule on the admis-
sibility of slave evidence to include capital cases. Its law was adopted in
1777.7 A typical statute was that of Mississippi (1822): "any negro or
mulatto, bond or free, shall be a good witness in pleas of the state, for or
against negroes or mulattoes, bond or free, or in civil pleas where free
negroes or mulattoes shall alone be parties, and in no other cases
whatever." 8 The deterioration in the legal position of free blacks was a
product of the revolutionary generation. But, in practice there were not
all that many cases in which the testimony of slaves figured prominently
in indictments against free blacks.
Race, as well as status, had become the basis for exclusion, and the
exclusion of the testimony of slaves against any white understandably
was scored by critics of the laws of slavery such as George M. Stroud and
Goodell.9 But what happened when the slave was not the victim of vio-
lence, but was the person who allegedly committed the criminal offense?
In many cases the answer was that the person never reached the courts at
all. Occasionally, slaves were victims of mob violence. An example oc-
curred in 1843 near Copiah, Mississippi. Two slaves, who had allegedly
raped a white woman, were taken off the plantation by a group of whites
and summarily hanged. According to the newspaper account, they were
"hung according to a statute of Judge Lynch, 'in such cases made and
provided.' "10 Moreover, while many petty offenses, such as thefts of
chickens and fights among the slaves, were handled on the plantations
6. THE LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND 199-200 (John D. Cushing & Michael Gla-
zier eds., 1978) (repealed 1847).
7. 1 N.C. REV. STAT. 583 (1837).
8. Miss. REV. CODE § 21 (1824).
9. GEORGE M. STROuD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL
STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 44 (Negro Universities Press 1968) (1827) (noting
that it was "the cause of the greatest evils of slavery."); GOODELL, supra note 2, at 303 (observing
that "[a] community or a Government that could tolerate such rejection of testimony-the testi-
mony of the defenseless against those holding and daily exercising despotic power over them-must
be resolutely bent on oppressing instead of protecting them.").
10. Miss. FREE TRADER, Feb. 24, 1843.
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themselves, capital cases normally went to the public courts."I
Once they got there, what rules of evidence applied? There is a fine
debate about the history of evidentiary rules for the exclusion of certain
kinds of testimony, such as hearsay testimony or the evidence of prior
convictions. James Bradley Thayer contended that the rules emerged
during the eighteenth century in order to control the discretion of ju-
ries. 12 Recently, John Langbein suggested it was to control lawyers.'
3
But neither jury discretion nor unethical lawyers mattered that much to
slaves during the eighteenth century. Of much more moment were the
rules that concerned the competency of someone to testify at all, and the
credibility to be given to their testimony if they were ruled competent.
During the seventeenth century there were two rules used in English
criminal trials which were of significance in the trials of slaves. Both
derived from Christian doctrine. The first was the two-witness rule
found in Deuteronomy.14 The second rule was that a person had to take
an oath before he would be admitted to testify. In the seventeenth cen-
tury, the theory behind the oath was that it was a way to bring forth
immediate divine vengeance upon false swearing.' 5 This was a time
when the belief in divine, as well as devilish, intervention in the affairs of
men was very deep.16 By the nineteenth century, when such beliefs were
11. James H. Hammond, Letter to an English Abolitionist, in THE IDEOLOGY OF SLAVERY:
PROSLAVERY THOUGHT IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH, 1830-1860, at 190 (1981). On the capital
trials of slaves see, for example, MICHAEL S. HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE
AND AUTHORITY IN MASSACHUSETrS AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1767-1878 (1980); PHILIP J.
SCHWARZ, TWICE CONDEMNED: SLAVES AND THE CRIMINAL LAWS OF VIRGINIA, 1705-1865
(1988).
12. JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 180
(Little, Brown & Co. 1969) (1898).
13. John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 306
(1978).
14. Deuteronomy 17:6. See also THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES CON-
CERNING THE INHABITANTS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS 54 (Thomas G. Barnes ed., 1975) (1648).
15. 9 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 189 (3d ed. 1978).
16. Even though the depth of religious belief might have been somewhat shallower in the colo-
nial South before the Great Awakening than it was in New England, it certainly was pervasive. One
illustration might be the daily diary entries of William Byrd. See, e.g., ANOTHER SECRET DIARY OF
WILLIAM BYRD OF WESTOVER FOR THE YEARS 1739-1741 (Maude H. Woodfin & Marion Tinling
eds., 1942). While there is no evidence that Southerners went so far in their condemnation of witch-
craft as did New Englanders, they were concerned. On New England witchcraft one of the finest
studies is JOHN P. DEMOS, ENTERTAINING SATAN: WITCHCRAFT AND THE CULTURE OF EARLY
NEW ENGLAND (1982). As one illustration for the South, consider the charge to the county officers
in Prince Georges County, Maryland in March, 1735. They were enjoined to uncover "all manner of
felonies Witchcrafts Enchantments Sorceries Arts Magick Trespassess .... " Entry for March, 1735,
in PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY COURT RECORD, MARCH 1735-MARCH 1738, MARYLAND HALL OF
RECORDS, [hereinafter MARYLAND HALL OF RECORDS]. On the Great Awakening in the South see
WESLEY M. GEWEHR, THE GREAT AWAKENING IN VIRGINIA, 1740-1790 (1930); Alan Gallay,
The Origins of Slaveholders' Paternalism: George Whitefleld, The Bryan Family, and the Great Awak-
ening in the South, 53 J.S. HIST. 369 (1987).
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less secure, the oath had become a way to remind the oath-taker of a
future punishment for false swearing. 17 As Simon Greenleaf, a master of
the law of evidence, put it in 1842:
one of the main provisions of the law, for the purity and truth of oral
evidence, is, that it be delivered under the sanction of an oath. Men in
general are sensible of the motives and restraints of religion, and ac-
knowledge their accountability to that Being, from whom no secrets
are hid. 18
The oath then was used to lay "hold on the conscience of the witness."' 9
Not everyone, however, was allowed to take an oath. The opinion
of Sir Edward Coke was that only a person who believed in a Christian
God could take a valid oath, and therefore the only competent witness
was a Christian.20 Sir William Holdsworth believed this view was break-
ing down because of "commercial considerations. ' 21 This transforma-
tion was reflected in the work of Sir Matthew Hale at the end of the
seventeenth century. He believed that an oath other than that required
of Christians was acceptable "in cases of necessity, as in forein [sic] con-
tracts between merchant and merchant. ' 22 Hale also was disturbed by
the notion that a murder might not be punishable if it were committed
"in presence only of a Turk or a Jew, that owns not the Christian reli-
gion."123 Hale would allow non-Christians to testify under an oath that
derived from their own religion. He did this grudgingly, however, and
ended with the observation "that the credit of such a testimony must be
left to the jury."' 24 Still, there had to be an oath of some sort.
While the demands of market capitalism opened the courts to some,
social status closed them to others. Holdsworth, for instance, noted that
the person who had been reduced to villeinage had "lost his law."
'25
Thomas R. R. Cobb, the Georgia author of the leading proslavery legal
treatise, made much of this. Only free men, he wrote, were "othesworth,"
and wherever villeinage or slavery existed in the past the testimony of
those in the "menial" or degraded social position was excluded alto-
gether.26 Cobb, in fact, came very close to saying that law was a system
only for the free. One theory behind the exclusion, according to him,
17. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 15, at 189-90.
18. 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 473 (Boston, Little &
Brown 1842).
19. Id.
20. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 15, at 190-91.




25. Id. at 191-92.
26. 1 COBB, supra note 1, at 227-29. Cobb observed that "the term 'law,' according to the
[Vol. 68:1209
SLAVES AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
was reflected in the assertion of the early Jewish historian, Josephus, that
the testimony of servants was not admitted "on account of the ignobility
of their soul."'27 Masters, moreover, were ever reluctant to give up their
property interests lightly, and especially to have them subject to the testi-
mony of the ignominious. This presented a serious problem for the legal
order. As the Maryland law makers observed in 1717:
it too often happens that Negro Slaves, &c. commit many Heinous and
Capital Crimes, which are endeavoured to be smothered, and con-
cealed, or else such Negroes, &c. are conveyed to some other Province,
and Sold by their Owners, who for the sake of the Interest they have in
their Lives and Services, suffer them to escape Justice.
28
The answer was not to admit the testimony of slaves. It was to provide
compensation to the owners of slaves who were executed.29 If the social
position of slaves, as well as the property interests of their masters, gener-
ally barred slaves from the public courts as witnesses altogether we have
missed something.
The first Virginia statute that dealt with evidence in slave trials is
conclusive of the fact that we have. It was a law of 1692 "for the more
speedy prosecution of slaves committing Capitall Crimes."' 30 The rules
of evidence concerned testimony in capital cases. There is no indication
of what rules applied in noncapital trials before the county Gentlemen
Justices. In capital cases the only testimony of a slave that was men-
tioned was the confession of the accused. The other evidence was the
"oaths of two witnesses or of one with pregnant circumstances. ' 31 Ac-
cording to Hale's 1678 treatise the evidence for the prisoner in English
courts was often not under oath, and the examination of the prisoner
prior to trial also was "not upon Oath."' 32 The 1692 Virginia law went
further. It excluded all testimony not under oath, except for the confes-
common law, is defined to be 'a freeman's privilege of being sworn in Court as a juror or witness.'"
Id. at 227.
27. Id. at 227-29.
28. THE LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND supro note 6, at 200 (repealed 1847).
29. All jurisdictions, at one time or another, provided some compensation, usually partial com-
pensation, to the owners of slaves executed by law. See the pathbreaking article, Marvin L. M. Kay
& Lorin L. Cary, 'The Planters Suffer Little or Nothing,' North Carolina Compensation for Executed
Slaves, 1748-1772, 40 Sci. & Soc'Y 288, 289 (1976).
30. 3 WILLIAM W. HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURES IN THE YEAR 1619, at 298
(Richmond 1821).
31. Id.
32. SIR MATrHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 262, 264 (Professional Books Ltd. 1972)
(1678) [hereinafter HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN]. This was virtually an outline of the larger study
by Hale that was published in 1736 posthumously. See SIR MATrHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN (William A. Stokes & Edward Ingersol eds., 1847) (1736).
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sion of the defendant. 33 By the time slavery was established in the seven-
teenth century in the English colonies the exclusion was not expressly
social as it had been in the case of villeinage. The exclusion now was
religious. As Sir William Hawkins observed in the 1720s in his Treatise
of the Pleas of the Crown, it was a good reason to exclude a witness be-
cause he was "an Infidel; That is, as I take it, that he believes neither the
Old nor New Testament to be the Word of God; on one of which our
Laws require the Oath should be administered." 34 The evidentiary rule
in the 1692 law referred first to the "oaths of two witnesses," and sec-
ondly, it mentioned "or of one with pregnant circumstances.1 35 In either
case a person had to take an oath, and the overwhelming majority of
slaves at that time were non-Christians. They could take no oath in an
English court. And seventeenth-century slave owners notoriously ob-
structed efforts to proselytize amongst them for fear that conversion
would lead to emancipation.
36
As early as 1680 the Reverend Morgan Godwyn complained about
this.37 Savage black slaves could not testify in Christian white English
courts in cases where slaves were on trial for their lives, except to confess.
Wholly consistent with this conclusion was an evidentiary rule buried
deep within an elaborate 1705 statute establishing and regulating the pro-
ceedings in the General Court. It read "that popish recusants convict,
negroes, mulattoes and Indian servants, and others, not being christians,
shall be deemed and taken to be persons incapable in law, to be witnesses
in any cases whatsoever.
' 38
Whites never viewed slaves as paragons of truthfulness, in any case.
Landon Carter, to take an illustration from the eighteenth century, wrote
in 1777: "Do not bring your negroe to contradict me! A negroe and a
passionate woman are equal as to truth or falsehood; for neither thinks of
what they say."' 39 And Cobb, in the next century, argued that "the ne-
gro, as a general rule, is mendacious, is a fact too well established to
require the production of proof, either from history, travels or
33. 3 HENING, supra note 30, at 103.
34. 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 434 (Garland Publish-
ing, Inc. 1978) (1721).
35. 3 HENING, supra note 30, at 103.
36. See, e.g., WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE NEGRO 1550-1812 (1968); Michael Anesko, So Discreet a Zeak Slavery and the Anglican
Church in Virginia, 1680-1730, 93 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 247 (1985).
37. MORGAN GODWYN, THE NEGRO'S & INDIANS ADVOCATE 36 (1680).
38. 3 HENING, supra note 30, at 298.
39. 2 THE DIARY OF LANDON CARTER OF SABINE HALL, 1752-1778, at 1107 (Jack P. Greene
ed., 1965) [hereinafter DIARY OF LANDON CARTER]. Earlier, in 1766, Carter had made the point
more succinctly: "A negroe can't be honest." 1 DIARY OF LANDON CARTER, supra, at 310.
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craniology. ' 4o
The result of such beliefs, and the corresponding legal rules, was
that until 1723 slaves could not testify (except to confess) in any capital
case in a Virginia court. They were largely outside the legal order except
as objects of the rules of property. But in that year the rule was changed,
and the reason shows that evidentiary rules could arise directly from a
concern to maintain domination as much as to assure justice. The pre-
amble made clear the reason for changing the evidentiary rule: it was to
remove the difficulties of punishing secret plots and conspiracies "known
only to such, as by the laws now established, are not accounted legal
evidence."'41 Governor Sir William Gooch, some years later, explained
that one of the problems that faced white Virginians in many slave cases
before 1723 was that "there could be no legal proof, so as to convict
them."' 42 The change in the evidentiary rule was occasioned by white
fears over slave insurrections, but it was not limited to rebels. It applied
to all capital cases. In any event, the burgesses dropped the two witness
requirement. They then added that the trial court could accept "such
testimony of Negroes, Mulattos, or Indians, bond or free, with pregnant
circumstances, as to them shall seem convincing. '43 Even in England
the two witness rule was transformed during the eighteenth century. By
the end it was retained only in cases of perjury and treason.44 The re-
quirement that the evidence of blacks be supported by pregnant circum-
stances, however, was the functional equivalent of the two witness rule.
Once the testimony of slaves was admitted the problem of perjury
arose. Coke defined the crime of perjury at common law in such a way
that it could not apply to the testimony of the overwhelming majority of
slaves in colonial Virginia. It was bound with the oath. "Perjury," he
wrote, "is a crime committed, when a lawfull oath is ministered by any
that hath authority, to any person, in any judiciall proceedings, who
sweareth absolutely, and falsly in a matter materiall to the issue."' 45 This
definition would not do: nor would the normal punishment for perjury,
which was a fine and/or imprisonment. The law of 1723 therefore pro-
40. 1 COBB, supra note 1, at 233. There is, of course, an extensive scholarly literature. One
might begin, for instance, with EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE
SLAVES MADE (1974), and GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND:
THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914 (1971).
41. 4 HENING, supra note 30, at 126.
42. HERBERT APTHEKER, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVE REVOLTS 177-78 (2d ed. 1969).
43. 4 HENING, supra note 30, at 127.
44. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 0370.
45. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:




vided a charge from the court that included the penalty which was
designed to assure that slaves as non-Christians would be under "the
greater obligation to declare the truth. '46 The charge was this:
You are brought hither as a witness; and, by the direction of the law, I
am to tell you, before you give your evidence, that you must tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; and that if it be
found hereafter, that you tell a lie, and give false testimony in this
matter, you must, for so doing, have both your ears nailed to the pil-
lory, and cut off, and receive thirty-nine lashes on your bare back, well
laid on, at the common whipping-post.
47
Six years after this law was adopted Toney and Jone, slaves in Richmond
County, learned its bloody seriousness as they lost their ears.48  So did
the slave Mary in Lancaster County in 1752. However, by that time
there is evidence that this law was not always strictly followed. In Lan-
caster County in 1754 Alec, who was found guilty of having given false
evidence against two fellow slaves, received only six lashes. And in that
same county in 1756 Will received thirty-nine lashes for "letting a Lye in
his Evidence Relating to Sambo" on trial for hog stealing. 49 The law of
1723 remained the basis for the admission of evidence in capital trials of
slaves in Virginia to the end of slavery in 1865, despite the vagaries of
enforcement.
Before the rules in other colonies and states are taken up, a word
about the phrase "pregnant circumstances." The legal treatises Virgini-
ans used, such as Michael Dalton's, or Hales', or Hawkins', did not use
the phrase. 50 John H. Baker, in his study of the criminal courts and
procedure from 1550 to 1800 noted that "strong and pregnant presump-
tion" was all that was necessary, according to some, to show that Crown
evidence was sufficiently "meet" or "fit" to proceed to trial. He did not
say it was sufficient or necessary to convict. 51 Hale had referred to
strong presumptive evidence, but he warned against it. He gave as an
example a case in which a man was found riding a horse that had been
stolen. This created a strong presumption that he stole the horse, and in
46. 4 HENING, supra note 30, at 128.
47. Id.
48. 10 AMERICAN LEGAL RECORDS: CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA, 120-
21 (Peter C. Hoffer & William B. Scott eds., 1984) [hereinafter 10 AMERICAN LEGAL RECORDS].
49. Trial of Davie, Robin, Daniel and Moll, May 25, 1752; Trial of Dick and Tom, January 17,
1754; and Trial of Sambo, March 19, 1756/7, Lancaster County Order Book No. 10 (1752-1756),
Virginia State Library, Richmond [hereinafter Virginia State Library].
50. MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE, CONTAINING THE PRACTICE OF THE JUS-
TICES OF THE PEACE OUR OF THEIR SESSIONS (1622); HALE, supra note 32; HAWKINS, supra note
34.
51. John H. Baker, Criminal Courts and Procedure at Common Law, 1550-1800, in CRIME IN
ENGLAND, 1550-1800, at 19 (James S. Cockburn ed., 1977).
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the case Hale related the man was executed. Later the real thief
confessed.
52
Sir William Blackstone discussed what he called "circumstantial evi-
dence or the doctrine of presumptions." His categorization included "vi-
olent," "probable," and "light, or rash" presumptions. The first was
"many times equal to full proof; for there those circumstances appear,
which necessarily attend the fact."' 53 It is unlikely that this is what the
Virginians had in mind. A violent presumption could be full proof and it
would not be necessary to admit the testimony of a savage black slave at
all. The next category comes closer. Probable presumptions arose from
a set of circumstances that "usually" attend a fact, and should be given
"due weight."154 This kind of circumstantial evidence could be used to
lend credibility to the testimony of a slave precisely because the last cate-
gory, "light, or rash," was not entitled to any consideration
whatsoever. 55
Now to return to the rules in the colonies. The rules in Delaware
are not clear. The law simply authorized the court to "acquit or con-
demn according to their Evidence" and to condemn "upon due Proof to
them made."' 56 Within Maryland a similar evidentiary history to that in
Virginia developed. The first mention of the testimony of slaves has been
noted. Inferentially, at least, the testimony of slaves was inadmissible in
capital slave trials. The first mention of separate capital trials was a law
of 1729, nearly contemporary to the critical Virginia law. It referred
only to a slave "convict, by confession, or verdict of a jury."' 57 There is
no reason to believe that slaves testified in such trials in Maryland any-
more than in Virginia. Aside from the evidence from the 1717 law, and
from the fact that the basic common law system prevailed, there is addi-
tional evidence in the colonial perjury law of 1699. The Maryland law
provided these punishments for the offense: fines, or a year in jail, or, if a
person could not pay his fine, he was to have his ears nailed, but not cut
off, and be forever precluded from being sworn as a witness. 58 There was
52. 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 32, at 289.
53. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *371.
54. Id.
55. Laws of the Government of New-Castle, Kent and Sussex upon Delaware, reprinted in THE
EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS OF DELAWARE 1704-1741, at 74 (John D. Cushing & Michael Glazier
eds., 1978).
56. 1 THE LAWS OF MARYLAND 191 (Virgil Maxcy ed., 1811).
57. Id.
58. THE LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND supra note 6, at 2 (repealed 1847). This
penalty followed the common law. Nailing the ears of free persons, of course, was only an alterna-
tive if the person were unable to pay his fine. In this sense, the perjury punishment for slaves in
Virginia was similar to that of the common law, except that the ears were cut off, and there was a
whipping instead of a fine, which, of course, slaves could not pay in any event.
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no other perjury statute, and this one did not embrace non-Christian
slaves who could not swear an oath. The Delaware law provided that
those guilty of perjury would be punished according to the law of Great
Britain.59 The language in the first direct law in Maryland on slave testi-
mony in capital cases lends more support insofar as Maryland is con-
cerned. The law of 1751 referred to a conviction of a slave "upon his, her
or their voluntary confession, or the verdict of a jury, upon the testimony
of one or more legal or credible witness or witnesses, or even the testi-
mony or the evidence of other slaves, corroborated with such pregnant
circumstances as shall convince and satisfy" those hearing the case. The
punishment for perjury by a slave followed Virginia. 6" To the South the
colony of North Carolina adopted the Virginia law in 1741.61
The evidentiary history in South Carolina differed. Its law of 169062
mentioned only that a magistrate was to conduct a preliminary examina-
tion where he was to have "all persons to come before him that can give
evidence."' 6a It is not certain that this meant only those persons who
could give evidence in an English court. The trial that followed was to be
based upon the testimony of the "evidences. '" 64 In English West Indian
colonies, according to Elsa Goveia, "at the discretion of the courts, the
evidence of slaves was admitted for or against other slaves" during the
eighteenth century. 65 But, according to Cobb, this was similar to the rule
in the French colonies where judges could use such testimony only to
"illustrate other testimony."' 66 As far as South Carolina is concerned,
59. Laws of the State of Delaware, reprinted in 1 THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELA-
WARE 65-66 (John D. Cushing & Michael Glazier eds., 1981).
60. 1 THE LAWS OF MARYLAND supra note 56, at 237.
61. A Collection of all the Public Acts ofAssembly of the Province of North-Carolina, reprinted in
I THE EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1669-1751, at 171-72 (John D. Cushing
ed., 1977). The exact language was that the court was "to take for Evidence, the Confession of the
Offender, the Oath of one or more credible Witnesses, or such Testimony of Negroes, Mulattoes, or
Indians, bond or free, with pregnant Circumstances, as to them shall seem convincing, without the
Solemnity of a Jury." Id. at 171. The penalty for perjury was the same as in Virginia, but this 1741
law did not require the justice to charge the slave the same way as in Virginia. In North Carolina
the "first Person in Commission" who sat on the trial of the slave was to charge any black or Indian,
"not being a Christian ... to declare the truth." Id. at 172.
62. For a general discussion of the early development of South Carolina slave law, see M.
Eugene Sirmans, The Legal Status of the Slave in South Carolina, 1670-1740, 28 J. S. HIST. 462
(1962).
63. 7 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 345 (Thomas Cooper & David J. McCord
eds., 1841).
64. Id.
65. GOVEIA, supra note 4, at 34.
66. 1 Coa, supra note 1, at 229:
By the Code Noir, the evidence of slaves was excluded in all cases in the French Colonies,
whether for or against freemen or slaves. The Judges were allowed to hear their evidence,
as suggestions to illustrate other testimony, but they were prohibited from drawing thence,
'aucunepresomption, ni conjecture, ni adminicule depreuve.' The same rule obtained in the
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the evidence is inconclusive. The next law was that of 1712 which
charged the court trying a slave with "diligently weighing and examining
all evidences, proofs and testimonies. ' 67 "Violent presumption and cir-
cumstances" could be considered in cases of murder.6 In petty larceny
cases slaves could be found guilty by "confession, proof, or probable cir-
cumstances." 69 Finally, in a separate part of the statute this appeared:
That the confession of any slave accused, or the testimony of any other
slave, that the justices and freeholders shall have reason to believe to
speak truth, shall be held for good and convincing evidence in all petty
larcenies or trespasses, not exceeding forty shillings; but no negro or
other slave shall suffer loss of life or limb, but such as shall be con-
victed, either by their own free and voluntary confession, or by the
oath of christian evidence, or, at least, by the plain and positive evi-
dence of two negroes or slaves, so circumstantiated as that there shall
not be sufficient reason to doubt the truth thereof, and examination
being always made, if the negroes or slaves that give evidence, do not
bear any malice to the other slave accused; excepting in the case of
murder, in which case, the evidence of one slave, attended with such
circumstances as that the justices and freeholders shall have no just
reason to suspect the truth thereof, of which they are hereby made
judges, or upon violent presumption of the accused person's guilt
"70
This was a complex effort to construct different layers of evidentiary
rules depending upon the seriousness of the offense. In minor crimes, the
rule resembled the Virginia law of 1723 on major slave crimes. The two
witness rule, possibly reenforced by something like a "pregnant circum-
stances" rule, applied to slave testimony in major crimes, except for mur-
der where once again the rule resembled the Virginia law of 1723. This
confusing effort was abandoned in 1735. By then the evidentiary rule
was basically the same as elsewhere:
[T]he confession of any slave accused, or the testimony of any other
slave or slaves, attended with circumstances of truth and credit, shall
be deemed good and convincing evidence on the trial of any slave or
slaves for any of the crimes aforesaid, or any other crimes, capital or
criminal; of the strength of which evidence, the said justices and free-
holders who try the same, are hereby made sufficient and competent
judges."
' 71
British West Indies, and it is a little remarkable that the commissioners appointed to in-
quire into their condition, with a view to meliorating the status of the slave, hesitated to
recommend a different rule, except in criminal cases.
Id. (citations ommited).
67. 7 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA supra note 63, at 355.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 356-57.
71. Id. at 389.
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By 1740 the rule took its final form in South Carolina. Now the
evidence:
of any slave, without oath, shall be allowed and admitted in all causes
whatsoever, for or against another slave accused of any crime or of-
fence whatsoever; the weight of which evidence being seriously consid-
ered, and compared with all other circumstances, attending the case,
shall be left to the conscience of the justices and freeholders. 72
Georgia followed this law in 1770.73 There was no oath, no two witness
rule, and no requirement that the testimony of slaves be corroborated by
"pregnant circumstances." The only voice raised in protest against this
1740 law was that of O'Neall, and that was not until 1848 by which time
many slaves were Christians. O'Neall suggested the propriety of taking
slave testimony under oath: "Negroes (slaves or free) will feel the sanc-
tions of an oath, with as much force as any of the ignorant classes of
white people, in a Christian country."' 74 The legislature did not agree.
Virginia and South Carolina displayed a legal atavism found no-
where else. Both retained the evidentiary rules framed between 1720 and
1740.75 In 1808 Maryland provided that the testimony of slaves was ad-
missible either for or against a slave defendant in all criminal prosecu-
tions. There was no reference to "pregnant circumstances. ' 76 Georgia
modified its rule slightly in 1816: "on the trial of a slave or free person of
colour, any witness shall be sworn who believes in God and a future state
of rewards and punishments."
'77
Without a doubt, however, the most interesting transformation oc-
72. Id. at 401.
73. Georgia patterned its 1770 slave code after this 1740 statute of South Carolina. An excel-
lent study of the adoption of slavery and the code in Georgia is BETTY WOOD, SLAVERY IN COLO-
NIAL GEORGIA, 1730-1775 (1984). In particular, see chapter 7, The Better Ordering and Governing
of Negroes.
74. JOHN B. O'NEALL, NEGRO LAW 14 (1846). His general attitude toward the mode in which
slaves were tried was summed up in his remark that it was the "worst system which could be de-
vised." Id. at 35. See also A. E. Keir Nash, Negro Rights, Unionism, and Greatness on the South
Carolina Court ofAppeals: The Extraordinary Chief Justice John Belton O'Neall, 21 S.C. L. REV.,
141 (1969).
75. See, e.g., THE REVISED CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA (Thomas Ritchie 1819). Vir-
ginia's law could be a bit misleading to the unwary. There were two sections in the 1819 code that
were relevant, sections 5 and 44. Section 5, based upon a law adopted in 1785, provided that "[a]ny
negro or mulatto, bond or free, shall be a good witness in pleas of the Commonwealth for or against
negroes or mulattoes, bond or free, or in civil pleas where free negroes or mulattoes shall alone be
parties, and in no other cases whatever." Id. at 422. Section 44 concerned "legal evidence," and
provided that "the court may take for evidence the confession of the offender, the oath of one or
more credible witnesses, or such testimony of negroes or mullatoes, bond or free, with pregnant
circumstances, as to them shall seem convincing." Id. at 431. The South Carolina rule is discussed
in O'NEALL, supra note 74, at 14.
76. 3 THE LAWS OF MARYLAND supra note 56, at 389.
77. Lucivs Q.C. LAMAR, A COMPILATION OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 805
(Augusta, T.S. Hannon 1821).
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curred in North Carolina where the issue of slave testimony, and espe-
cially the "pregnant circumstances" standard came before the state
supreme court in 1821 in State v. Ben.78 It was most interesting because
different views, missing from the black letter of a statute, were articulated
by the judges. Daniel Flanigan, one of the few to analyze this decision,
condemned the reasoning of the majority opinion of Chief Justice John
Louis Taylor which overthrew the "pregnant circumstances" rule, and
led to the execution of Ben for burglary. It was based upon a "superficial
equalitarian rhetoric" blind to the realities of slavery, and to the fact that
the "pregnant circumstances" rule was actually both a "relic" and an
"important statutory protection" for slaves. 79 There are some important
assumptions in this analysis. One of those was that the rule should have
been retained. But, why? The assumption that this was an important
protection for slaves may rest upon the notion that Southern whites were
correct after all: slaves could not be trusted to tell the truth because they
were not free agents, and therefore no slave should ever be condemned
on the testimony of slaves alone, without some corroboration. This was
the view of the abolitionist critics Stroud and Goodell. They had argued
that the testimony of slaves against slaves was especially suspect because
Southern law allowed the emancipation of slaves for "meritorious serv-
ices" and that one of those was "giving information of crimes committed
by a slave."80 This is fanciful, except in the case of insurrections where it
does hold true.8 1 But it also rests upon a pejorative view of slaves them-
selves, of their sense of community and solidarity. Susan Rhodes, a for-
mer slave, recalled, for example, that "[p]eople in my day didn't know
book learning but dey studied how to protect each other, and save 'em
from such misery as they could."' 82 I do not mean to suggest that Flani-
78. 8 N.C. (Hawks) 434 (1821).
79. Daniel Flanigan, The Criminal Law of Slavery and Freedom, 124-25 (1973) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University). Flanigan considered this case "a classic of the law of slavery"
because it "illustrated the Orwellian world the slave endured even when he approached equality with
whites."
80. GOODELL, supra note 2, at 315, merely followed Stroud's earlier statement. See STROUD,
supra note 9, at 93.
81. A very early example of this practice was the grant of freedom to Will in 1710. The bur-
gesses granted him his freedom because he was "signally serviceable in discovering a conspiracy of
diverse negroes" in Surry County. They intended upon "levying war in this colony." 3 HENING,
supra note 30, at 537. Will got his freedom for his "fidelity and for encouragement of such services."
Id. One frustrating aspect of this case is that, according to the Lieutenant-Governor, the "chief
conspirators" were "tryed this General Court, found guilty, and will be executed." The records of
the General Court have not survived so that it is not possible to know what evidence was used to
convict the two "chief conspirators." Given the existing rules of evidence it is not likely that Will's
testimony would do. It is more likely that confessions were extorted from the slaves. APTHEKER,
supra note 42, at 170-71.
82. THOMAS L. WEBBER, DEEP LIKE THE RIVERS: EDUCATION IN THE SLAVE QUARTER
COMMUNITY, 1831-1865, at 63-64 (1978).
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gan had in mind a negative view of the sense of community among the
slaves, only that it lay beneath the surface of the abolitionist argument.
Another possible unwritten assumption, which I do not share, could be
that because of the cruelty of human bondage almost all slave offenses
should be viewed as "political. ' 83 They were protests against degrada-
tion, and therefore rather ordinary rules of law used to convict rather
ordinary felons should not apply. Whether the point is that slaves could
not be trusted to tell the truth, or that slave offenses were "political," the
result seems to be the same. Slave testimony should not have been tested
by the ordinary rules. In any event, Taylor's opinion did not proceed
upon such assumptions. He argued that from 1793 forward, basic com-
mon law rules of evidence applied in the trials of slaves. The law of that
year granted trial by jury to slaves, and Taylor argued that it drew "after
it, as an incident, the common-law principles of evidence and all the con-
sequences of common-law proceedings."
'84
There was one exception Taylor admitted, and it is ironic. A law of
1802 retained the evidentiary rule from 1741 in cases of trials of slaves
for insurrection, or conspiracy to rebel. This was a narrow exception in
his view, and was "passed soon after some disturbances had arisen
among the slaves in the lower part of the State, and the clause was proba-
bly re-enacted for the purpose of tempering that excess which public ex-
citement had produced in the trials for these offenses."8 5 The irony, of
course, is that the rule originally had been tied to a law designed to un-
cover slave insurrections, but was retained in order to protect slaves
against white hysteria about such insurrections.
John Hall vigorously dissented: "[t]hat the policy of the law of
1741," he wrote, "was founded on a sense of the degraded state in which
those unhappy beings existed, no doubt, will be ceded. Being slaves, they
had no will of their own, and a humane policy forbade that the life of a
human being [one of themselves] should be taken away upon testimony
coming from them, unless some circumstance appeared in aid of that
83. One scholar who tends to view slave crime in a political sense is Philip J. Schwarz. In a
very useful article, for example, he referred to a hog stealing case as one in which slaves "consciously
challenged the system of slave control." Philip J. Schwarz, Gabriel's Challenge: Slaves and crime in
Late Eighteenth-Century Virginia, 90 VA. MAG. HIsT. & BIOGRAPHY 283, 284 (1982) [hereinafter
Schwarz, Gabriel's Challenge]. See also Philip J. Schwarz, Forging the Schackles: The Development
of Virginia's Criminal Code for Slaves, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH
125- 46 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1984). For a critical review of this position
see Paul Finkelman, Prosecutions in Defense of the Cornerstone, 17 REV. AM. HIsT. 397, 403 (1989).
84. State v. Ben, 8 N.C. (Hawks) 434, 436 (1821).
85. Id. at 437-38. This provision on pregnant circumstances remained part of the law of North
Carolina. See REVISED CODE OF NORTH CAROLINA 572 (Bartholomew F. Moore & Asa Biggs eds.,
1855).
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testimony."'8 6 The testimony of social subordinates simply was not to be
believed. They lacked free will. The majority of the court, however, dis-
agreed with Hall's analysis based upon social status.
Outside of the older colonial slave societies the pregnant circum-
stances requirement appeared for a time in Kentucky, Tennessee, Missis-
sippi and Alabama. It did not appear in other states, and these four
dropped the rule between the 1830s and the 1850s.87  Elsewhere the evi-
dence of slaves was sufficient to convict or acquit, and in Georgia and
Louisiana it could be testimony taken under oath.88
Whether sworn or not-and it usually was not-by the nineteenth
century the evidence of slaves could be sufficient to convict or acquit
slaves. The problem of perjury was universally dealt with by corporal
punishment. Most states, however, had substituted a whipping for the
mutilation adopted in Virginia, but it could be severe. In some states the
number of lashes was thirty-nine,8 9 and in Alabama the number could
reach 100 and the perjurer would then be branded with a P.90
II
While the rules of evidence regarding the admissibility of the testi-
mony of slaves in the trials of slaves had changed considerably by the
nineteenth century the question remains, how did it work in practice?
Was it common for slaves to be convicted, or acquitted solely on the
basis of the testimony of other slaves? Betty Wood, in her study of a
hand full of slave trials in Georgia, for example, suggested that it was
86. Ben, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) at 441.
87. The rule is in the Tennessee law of 1815 on the trial of slaves. 1815 Tenn. Pub. Acts 175.
By 1857, however, the state's code read simply that "the trial of a slave for a capital offence shall be
conducted in the same manner as that of a free person," THE CODE OF TENNESSEE 5 10 (Return J.
Meigs & William F. Cooper eds., 1858). Mississippi, in its massive 1822 code, followed the Virginia
pattern of 1819. Section 21 provided that blacks could testify, and section 58 considered "legal
evidence" in terms of the testimony of blacks, slave or free, along with a pregnant circumstances
requirement. Miss. REV. CODE 373, 382 (1824). By 1857, however, the pregnant circumstances
requirement had disappeared. Miss. REV. CODE, art. 62, at 249 (1857). The 1798 law of Kentucky
that required the corroboration was patterned after the Virginia law, 2 A DIGEST OF THE STATUTE
LAWS OF KENTUCKY 1475 (C. S. Morehead and Mason Brown eds., 1834). By the 1850s slaves
were to be tried for offenses punished with death "in the same mode and manner as free persons are
tried." THE REVISED STATUTES OF KENTUCKY 377 (Richard H. Stanton ed., 1860). Alabama fol-
lowed the pregnant circumstances rule as late as 1836. A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
ALABAMA 123 (John D. Aiken ed., 2d ed. 1836). By 1852 the state provided that, in general, the
trial of slaves was to be "in the mode provided by law for the trial of white persons." THE CODE OF
ALABAMA 595 (John J. Ormond et al. eds., 1852).
88. See, e.g., THE REVISED STATUTES OF LOUISIANA 58 (John Claiborne ed., 1856).
89. An example of the thirty-nine lashes approach is THE REVISED STATUTES OF KENTUCKY
377 (Richard H. Stanton ed., 1860).
90. THE CODE OF ALABAMA 595 (John J. Ormond et al. eds., 1852). Mississippi continued to
provide for the mutilation of slaves by cutting off ears. Miss. REV. CODE 249 (1824).
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not. She found only one in which the verdict was "[at least in theory]
entirely dependent upon evidence supplied by other slaves." 91 He was
convicted, hanged, and his head was put up on a pole. This case does not
show that a slave had been convicted solely on the testimony of other
slaves: they had attempted to establish his innocence. While slaves often
tried to help one another with their testimony, it was not always so.
In 1746 in Lancaster County, Virginia, for instance, the slave Guy
was found guilty of stealing breeches valued at one shilling. He was
given thirty-five lashes. This was on the testimony of three slaves, two of
whom were slaves of Guy's owner, Landon Carter.92 In 1750 in the same
county, Sarah at first pled not guilty when placed on trial, but later she
changed that to plead guilty to having "rec'd Sundry" goods. She then
implicated seven slaves in all, and only one of them was discharged. Sa-
rah apparently testified in order to minimize her own punishment. 93
Some slaves turned state's evidence in capital burglary trials in order to
save their lives.
In 1741 Ben and Dedan were indicted for breaking and entering the
public warehouse and stealing a hogshead of tobacco. The evidence
against Ben was given by Jacob, George, and Dedan, all slaves. Dedan
was "released from his tryal" because he had become "a material evi-
dence for our Sovereign lord the King." Ben was found guilty but he was
not executed because he was granted his clergy.94 Slaves were no more
heroic or ignominious than anyone else, and to overlook this obvious fact
is to slip into romanticism.
Similar impressions emerge from the nineteenth-century records. In
Fairfield County, South Carolina, for example, four slaves and a free
black were tried for "violating the peace" in 1849. The testimony came
from two slaves, Tom and William. Tom testified that George and Levy
"were Quarreling at the time he Saw George have a knife in his hand and
open and heard him say to Levy that if he did not Stand away from him
91. Betty Wood, "Until He Shall Be Dead, Dead, Dead:" The Judicial Treatment of Slaves in
Eighteenth-Century Georgia, 71 GA. HIST. Q. 377, 391 (1987). See also John C. Edwards, Slave
Justice in Four Middle Georgia Counties, 57 GA. HIST. Q. 265 (1973); Royce Gordon Shingleton,
The Trial and Punishment of Slaves in Baldwin County, Georgia, 1812-1826, 8 S. HUMAN. REv. 67
(1974); Lord Proprietary v. Kate, June Court, 1755, Talbot County Court Criminal Judgments,
1751-1755, MARYLAND HALL OF RECORDS, supra note 16.
92. Trial of Guy, March 25, 1746, Lancaster County Order Book No. 9, 1743-1752, Virginia
State Library, supra note 49. 1 DIARY OF LANDON CARTER, supra note 39, at 370-71, 415.
93. Trial of Sarah, September 6, 1750, Lancaster County Order Book No. 9, 1743-1752, Vir-
ginia State Library, supra note 49.
94. Trial of Ben and Dedan, September 6, 1750, Lancaster County Order Book No. 9, 1743-
1752, Virginia State Library, supra note 49; 1 DIARY OF LANDON CARTER, supra note 39, at 370-71,
415.
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he would Cut or Stick him he saw Levy go to the fence and Get a piece of
a Fence Rail he was persuaded to and did lay the Rail down." 95 William
testified that Elijah Bond, the free black, "commenced the Quarrel with
George."'96 It was when conflicts erupted within the slave or black com-
munity that one could expect cases to rest solely upon the testimony of
slaves.
One special category of crime was the conspiracy to commit an in-
surrection. This was precisely the crime that had led Southern whites to
admit slave testimony in the first place. There is no question but that
such testimony was critical in convicting the slave defendants in such
cases.97 It was critical in the insurrection panic that hit the iron fields in
Tennessee in 1856, for instance. 9 But in insurrection conspiracy cases,
that case also shows that the evidence that was admitted was often ob-
tained in clear violation of normal common-law rules. It came as the
result of confessions or accusations that followed torture.99 Torture was
commonplace in civil law systems, such as in Spanish Louisiana. In
1771, for instance, a Louisiana slave was ordered to "be tortured to make
him confess who were his accomplices." ' °0 The use of torture was not a
95. Trial of George, Jan. 27, 1849, Fairfield District: Records of Magistrates and Freeholders
Courts, 1846-1851, Trial Papers, South Carolina Department of Archives and History [hereinafter
South Carolina Archives and History].
96. Id. See also the Trial of Martin and Dave, Feb. 26, 1857, Spartanburg District, Records of
Magistrates and Freeholders Courts, Trial Papers, South Carolina Archives and History, supra note
95. This case involved the accidental killing of a slave in a fight that erupted over a card game.
Another example would be the case of Balaam, May 7, 1856, Anderson District, Records of Magis-
trates and Freeholders Courts, Trial Papers. Id. Balaam was charged with breaking into the dwell-
ing of Wade Dennis, a free black. The slave Brad testified that Balaam had claimed that he had
"Dennis's papers." He told him that he later burned them. The slave Dover testified that Dennis
had offered him $10 to find out who burned his fodder stack and robbed him. He said that Balaam
"told him that he burn'd Wade Dennis' fodder." In this case, however, a number of whites provided
Balaam with an alibi and he was acquitted. Slaves, of course, did not usually turn to the public
courts. An example of a different approach occurred on the Dabney plantation in Mississippi where
a number of slaves succeeded in having their owner sell a slave woman who had been a frequent thief
in the quarters. SUSAN DABNEY SMEDES, MEMORIALS OF A SOUTHERN PLANTER 90 (Fletcher M.
Green ed., 1965). GENOVESE, supra note 40, at 606-07, noted that while we can never really know
how often slaves stole from one another, it was a problem on some plantations.
97. Records of the trials in New York and Charleston are published. DANIEL HORsMANDEN,
THE NEW-YORK CONSPIRACY (1810), reprinted in THE NEW YORK CONSPIRACY (Thomas J. Davis
ed, 1971); LIONEL H. KENNEDY & THOMAS PARKER, AN OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE TRIALS OF
SUNDRY NEGROES, CHARGED WITH AN ATrEMPT TO RAISE AN INSURRECTION IN THE STATE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA (1822). On the Vesey conspiracy in Charleston, see also JOHN LOFTON, INSUR-
RECTION IN SOUTH CAROLINA: THE TURBULENT WORLD OF DENMARK VESEY (1964). On the
Gabriel conspiracy, see GERALD W. MULLIN, FLIGHT AND REBELLION: SLAVE RESISTANCE IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA (1972); Schwarz, Gabriel's Challenge, supra note 83, at 283.
98. See Charles B. Dew, Black Ironworkers and the Slave Insurrection Panic of 1856, 41 J. S.
HIsT. 321, 322, 328 (1975).
99. Id. at 329.
100. Laura L. Porteous, Torture in Spanish Criminal Procedure, 8 LA. HIST. Q. 6, 16 (1925).
This case involved slaves who murdered their master, Juan Baptiste Cezaire Lebreton.
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feature of the common-law, however. Southern whites nonetheless were
not squeamish about the use of the whip despite the common law tradi-
tion, and this was especially true in cases involving charges of
insurrection.
The major insurrection cases are well known.' 0 ' But the use of force
to obtain evidence or confessions was also used on lesser occasions. In
Spartanburg County, South Carolina, for example, a number of slaves
were "tried" at Otts Bridge on September 24, 1860. A number of whites
conducted this ad hoc trial. They even kept written testimony which was
turned over to the lawful authorities. After slaves such as John and
Glenn testified about some mysterious white man, the result was that
seven slaves were ordered blindfolded and whipped between thirty and
eighty-five lashes apiece. On September 28 there was a formal indict-
ment against Jerry, Anderson, Ellis, Andy and Steve for a conspiracy to
raise an insurrection in the neighborhood. 0 2 The trial before the magis-
trate-freeholders began on October 2, 1860. The primary testimony
came from the same John who had been tried and found guilty at Otts
Bridge. He testified that he had not told the whole truth there because he
was afraid. His current evidence came after he was "whipped in jail and
made to tell it." What he testified to was that he was at a cave where
there were some runaways. According to John, "Anderson was talking
about being set free-people wer [sic] coming from the North to set them
free said he expected the black people would have to fight and he would
fight if he was obliged to Ellis said about the same... ,,03 There was
virtually nothing said about the other slaves, and on the testimony of
John the magistrate-freeholders reached this verdict: "the boys Anderson
and Ellis they think are guilty to some extent." The members of the
court added that "they think that they may have had some thought and
made some preparation of an insurrectionary tendency." The magis-
trate-freeholders ordered them to receive fifty lashes each.' 0 4
Despite such occasional reliance on the "evidence" of slaves the
overwhelming majority of criminal trials of slaves in the South did not
101. In addition to the works cited supra note 97, see PETER H. WOOD, BLACK MAJORITY:
NEGROES IN COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA FROM 1670 THROUGH THE STONO REBELLION (1974);
THE SOUTHAMPTON SLAVE REVOLT OF 1831: A COMPILATION OF SOURCE MATERIAL (Henry I.
Tragle ed., 1973); STEPHEN B. OATES, THE FIRES OF JUBILEE: NAT TURNER'S FIERCE REBELLION
(1975).
102. Trial of Jerry et al., Oct. 2-11, 1860, Spartanburg District, Records of Magistrates-Free-
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turn on the testimony of slaves alone. 0 5 Some crimes necessarily in-
volved the testimony of whites, such as rapes, assaults on whites, or at-
tempts to kill whites. The few crimes that did involve only the testimony
of slaves were the slave insurrection conspiracy, those crimes that arose
out of some disruption within the slave community itself, or, finally, the
handful of criminal cases when slaves turned state's evidence in order to
minimize or escape punishment.
III
The major exception was the "confession," which had always been
admitted into evidence. Greenleaf noted that confessions of guilt were to
be received with considerable caution. Among the reasons were the fact
that a prisoner might be "oppressed by the calamity of his situation," and
influenced by motives of "hope or fear."'10 6 Nevertheless, if the threshold
problem of admissibility were crossed "deliberate confessions of guilt"
were to be viewed as "the most effectual proofs in the law."' 0 7 This
rested upon the view that "they are deliberate and voluntary, and on the
presumption, that a rational being will not make admissions prejudicial
to his interest and safety, unless when urged by the promptings of truth
and conscience."'
10 8
A suggestive view of lower class defendants is that they often be-
haved with submissiveness and deference when brought into court before
their social "betters."' 9 One test of this view when applied to slaves
would be the commonness of confessions. By this test slaves must have
been a disappointment. They rarely confessed. In eleven Virginia coun-
ties examined for eighteenth-century cases, for instance, I found only fif-
teen confessions.110 The relative numbers of confessions did not rise in
105. This is a firm impression based upon reading the lower court records, as lean as they often
are, for over fifty counties in all of the slave states.
106. GREENLEAF, supra note 18, § 214.
107. Id. § 215.
108. Id.
109. 10 AMERICAN LEGAL RECORDS, supra note 48, at xxxi, for instance, notes that defendants
in Richmond County were often quite submissive. They even declined to demand a jury trial when
entitled to one. A similar observation in New York led Goebel and Naughton to suggest that upper-
class judges rarely confronted lower-class suspects in misdemeanor cases who demanded trials. Ju-
LIUS GOEBEL, JR., & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK
78 (New York 1970) (1944).
110. The eleven counties were Caroline, Charles City, Essex, Fauquier, King George, Lancaster,
Orange, Princess Anne, Richmond, Southampton, and Sussex. The periods covered ranged from ten
to fifty years. Of the fifteen confession cases only five involved capital sentences: four were burgla-
ries, and one was a murder. One of the slaves convicted of burglary received benefit of clergy. The
murder case is discussed in the text, Trial of Wapping, May 30, 1722, Lancaster County Order Book
No. 7, 1721-1729, Virginia State Library, supra note 49. All of the burglary cases were in Richmond
County. Trial of Harry, July 1738, reprinted in 10 AMERICAN LEGAL RECORDS supra note 48, at
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the next century, either.I1 I One of the early Virginia cases, moreover, is
not truly a confession at all. In 1729/30 Harry lost his ears in Richmond
County for stabbing another slave. The only evidentiary entry was that
he was adjudged guilty "not Denying What is laid to his charge."' 1 2
This is a case of a slave whose refusal to plead was taken as a confession
of guilt.
One of the more interesting cases involved a murder. It is interest-
ing because it is so rare, and was one of the only cases that arose before
the admission of slave testimony in 1723. It was in the trial of Wapping
in 1722 in Lancaster County for the murder of Guy, another slave. He
had assaulted him with "Axes Clubs &c. '"t1 3 If slaves could not testify
against each other before the 1720s, and if almost none "confessed" like
Wapping, how much criminal conduct by slaves was not punished in
public courts as a practical matter before that time? Scholars have often
claimed that slave crime increased by the middle of the Eighteenth cen-
tury," 4 but have failed to see that one reason for the statistical increase
187 (he received clergy); Trial of Dick, Sept. 1749, reprinted in id. at xlix, 240-41; Trial of Newman
and Sam, Sept. 1749, reprinted in id. at 1, 241-42; Trial of Daniel, Nov. 1753, reprinted in id. at 244-
46. Newman and Sam pled as follows: they "Confessed that they were in some part guilty of the said
felony and burglary but not of the Whole." Trial of Newman and Sam, supra, at 242. They put
themselves on the court for trial, were found guilty, and sentenced to death. Id. Aside from the
murder case there was only one other case of violence. Harry stabbed another slave in 1730. Trial of
Harry, 1729/30, reprinted in id. at 123. This case is discussed in the text. All the remaining cases
were property crimes. One involved receiving stolen goods. Trial of Sarah, September 6, 1750, Lan-
caster County Order Book No. 9, 1743-1752, Virginia State Library, supra note 49. This case was
also discussed in the text. The remaining eight cases all were charges of hog stealing. They were as
follows: Trial of Will, Aug. 12, 1748, Caroline County Order Book, 1746-1754; Trial of Jones, Mar.
19, 1748/9, Caroline County Order Book, 1746-1754; Trial of Citto, June 4, 1752, King George
County Order Book, 1751-1765; Trial of Aaron, Sept. 24, 1767, Orange County Order Book 7, 1763-
1769; Trial of Ned, Nov. 7, 1771, Princess Anne County Minute Book 9, 1770-1773; Trial of Rip-
pon, January Court, 1742, Charles City County Order Book, 1737-1751; Trial of Harry and Jack,
December Court, 1746, Charles City County Order Book, 1737-1751; and, finally, Trial of Dick,
Oct. 4, 1758, Charles City County Court Orders, 1758-1762, Virginia State Library, supra note 49.
111. A couple of illustrations should suffice. I found no confessions in Elbert County, Georgia
between 1837-1849 (the years for which full records are extant), and but one in Chatham County,
Georgia, which included Savannah, between 1813-1827, and 1850-1859. On February 11, 1857 Wil-
liam pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Chatham County, Georgia, Superior Court Minutes,
1855-1859, Georgia Department of Archives and History. A final example might be the confession
of Ned in Jessamine County, Kentucky in 1842. He was the only slave I found in the county's
records for the years 1800-1849 who confessed. He had admitted to his master that he sold some
goods that had been taken in a burglary, and had left some at his wife's home. Papers in Ned's case
filed in Box #8, 1840-1842, Circuit Court Clerk, Circuit Court Indictments, Jessamine County,
Kentucky, 9 boxes, Kentucky State Archives, Frankfort.
112. Trial of Harry, Feb. 1729/30, reprinted in 10 AMERICAN LEGAL RECORDS, supra note 48,
at 123.
113. Trial of Wapping, Mary. 30, 1722, Lancaster County Order Book No. 7, 1721-1729, Vir-
ginia State Library, supra note 49.
114. See, e.g., 10 AMERICAN LEGAL RECORDS, supra note 48, at I-li.
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was the earlier exclusion of slave testimony. This skews the picture, and
may well present a false impression of the magnitude of the increase.
IV
We know, of course, that owners often punished offenses on the
plantation, but what happened if the offender or the offense never came
to the attention of the whites? Was there some mode of social control
among the slaves in their conduct toward one another? Were they in the
process of creating a body of norms for conduct within the quarters in
terms of respect for possessions, or norms that regulated sexual relation-
ships which, if broken, brought out some sanction by the slaves them-
selves? Scholars have recognized the degree to which slaves created first a
pidgin, and then a creolized language within the quarters, and the fact
that they firmly grasped, even when they modified, the various elements
of African culture. This included such things as rhythmic patterns, reli-
gious practices, and folk tales. 1 5 But, if they retained all of this in syn-
cretic forms, why should we assume that they failed to retain any of the
various African notions of legal right and wrong, and legal ways of social
control? Unfortunately, the degree to which slaves might have held onto
ways to define acceptable behavior within the quarters, and to sanction
deviations, is beyond recall. Nonetheless, there is one very suggestive
piece of evidence recounted by Thomas Webber in his work on the signif-
icance of the "spirit world" among the slaves. 1 6 It concerned the man-
ner of uncovering thieves within the quarters:
The third way of detecting thieves was taught by the fathers and
mothers of the slaves. They said no matter how untrue a man might
have been during his life, when he came to die he had to tell the truth
and had to own everything he had ever done, and whatever dealing
those alive had with anything pertaining to the dead, must be true, or
they would immediately die and go to hell to burn in fire and brim-
stone. So in consequence of this, the graveyard dust was the truest of
the three ways in detecting thieves. The dust would be taken from the
grave of a person who had died last and put into a bottle with water.
Then two of the men of the examining committee would use the same
115. Among the fine studies that might be consulted are GENOVESE, supra note 40; LAWRENCE
W. LEVINE, BLACK CULTURE AND BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS: AFRO-AMERICAN FOLK THOUGHT
FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (1977); HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY
AND FREEDOM, 1750-1925 (1976); JOHN BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION
LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1972); CHARLES JOYNER, DOWN BY THE RIVERSIDE: A
SOUTH CAROLINA SLAVE COMMUNITY (1984); MARGARET WASHINGTON CREEL, "A PECULIAR
PEOPLE": SLAVE RELIGION AND COMMUNITY-CULTURE AMONG THE GULLAHS (1988); STER-
LING STUCKEY, SLAVE CULTURE: NATIONALIST THEORY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF BLACK
AMERICA (1987).
116. WEBRER, supra note 82, ch. 10.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
words as in the case of the Bible and the sieve, "John stole that
chicken," "John did not steal that chicken," and after this had gone on
for about five minutes, then one of the other two who attended to the
Bible and the sieve would say, "John, you are accused of stealing that
chicken that was taken from Sam's chicken coop at such a time." "In
the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, if you have
taken Sam's chicken don't drink this water, for if you do you will die
and go to hell and be burned in fire and brimstone but if you have not
you may take it and it will not hurt you." So if John had taken the
chicken he would own it rather than take the water.117
Such a "trial" with its rules of evidence shows it is a reasonable specula-
tion that the slaves maintained a quasi-legal order among themselves de-
spite their exclusion for most purposes from the courts of the whites.
Surely the legal notions of Africans did not suddenly disappear any more
than their view of appropriate family relationships or the significance of
magic.
V
There was then enormous complexity and ambivalence in the ways
slave conduct was controlled and sanctioned if it fell outside accepted
norms, and public law was only one level of control. Offenses might be
dealt with outside the public courts by the whites on the plantations, or
by the blacks themselves outside the observation of the whites, not to
mention the discipline that existed within the Southern churches.I 8 But
the immediate problem is the question of slave evidence in the courts of
the whites. With the evidence in the public courts, there were serious
problems presented above all by the confession. They focus around the
question of "voluntariness.""1 9  In some cases, there is no doubt
whatever that the confession was not the result of a voluntary act by the
accused. For instance, in 1818 in Richmond, Virginia the Common
Council verified a charge that an "engine of torture," which turned out
to be a finger screw, had been used by public authorities to extort confes-
117. Id. at 120-21 (quoting JACOB STROYER, SKETCHES OF MY LIFE IN THE SOUTH (Salem,
Salem Press 1879)). This might be compared to some of the samples discussed in E. ADAMSON
HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL DYNAMICS (1972).
118. On church discipline, see DONALD G. MATHEWS, RELIGION IN THE OLD SOUTH 146-48
(1977). One interesting case arose in the Salem Baptist Church in Marlborough County, South
Carolina in the 1850s. A master charged his slaves with theft of hams from the smoke-house. The
charge was before the church, not the local magistrate. The slaves unsuccessfully tried to defend
themselves with the argument that since they had contributed to the preparation of the hams by
their labor they had merely taken what was theirs.
119. One of the fullest accounts of the voluntariness problem in confessions is MARK TUSHNET,
THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST
127-37 (1981).
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sions from black defendants regardless of the crime. 120 Or, consider the
matter-of-fact entry in the case of the trial of Ben for burglary in South-
ampton County, Virginia in 1821. After his arrest he "was... taken out
and with small cords Suspended by the thumbs for about one minute, but
the prisoner made no confession he was then tied by the toes and drawn
up but not entirely off the ground," but he still did not confess. After he
spent the night in the custody of a young man he did confess, although
the record does not show why. He was sentenced to hang with a recom-
mendation that he be transported. His counsel made no complaint.121
But there was an even deeper question about "voluntariness" which
arose because of the use of violence. If slaves were without wills of their
own, how could their confessions ever be voluntary, and therefore admis-
sible? This question arose within the context of both judicial and extra-
judicial confessions. Cobb, for one, argued that extra-judicial confes-
sions, when made to masters, should not be admissible as evidence. Ac-
cording to him, the slave "is bound, and habituated to obey every
command and wish" of the master.1 22 The slave
has no will to refuse obedience, even when it involves his life. The
master is his protector, his counsel, his confidant .... Every consider-
ation which induces the law to protect from disclosures confidential
communications made to legal advisers, applies with increased force to
communications made by a slave to his master. Moreover, experience
shows, that the slave is always ready to mould his answers so as to
please the master, and that no confidence can be placed in the truth of
his statements.1 23
Southern jurists usually did not go that far. Nearly all the appellate cases
came during the 1850s, but the first notable one was decided in 1830 in
North Carolina in State v. Charity.124 This case turned on the admissibil-
ity of evidence of a master. Judge Thomas Ruffin focused upon the ques-
tion of whether or not the master could testify for or against his slave,
but in the course of his analysis he mentioned that confessions "being to
the master, may or may not be of that voluntary character which the law,
not less in wisdom than humanity, requires," but this case did not require
an examination of that problem which presented "not a little diffi-
culty.' 25 Judge Hall remarked that the slave might object to her master
120. See Marianne Burloff Sheldon, Black- White Relations in Richmond, Virginia, 1782-1820, 45
J.S. HIST. 32 (1979).
121. Trial of Ben, 1821, Southampton County Court Order Book, 1819-1822, at 341, Virginia
State Library, supra note 49.
122. 1 COB, supra note 1, at 272.
123. Id.
124. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 543 (1830).
125. Id. at 545.
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giving in as evidence her confession to him because "he is authorized to
defend her; and because she is his slave, and by various means, against
which slavery could make but little resistance, he might exact from her
any confessions he pleased." He added, however, that "upon this part of
the case I give no opinion." 26 Chief Justice Leonard Henderson believed
that the confessions of slaves to masters ought always to be excluded
from evidence. "The master," he noted, "has an almost absolute control
over both the body and mind of his slave. The master's will is the slave's
will. All his acts, all his sayings are made with a view to propitiate his
master. His confessions are made, not from a love of truth, not from a
sense of duty, not to speak a falsehood, but to please his master...
Courts that faced the issue later did not go as far as Henderson
urged in 1830, or as Cobb suggested in his late 1850s treatise. Still,
judges often were suspicious of confessions made by slaves to those with
direct authority over them. Edwin and Nelson, for instance, were tried
for murder in Louisiana in 1848. The court overturned the guilty verdict
against Nelson and affirmed that against Edwin. Judge George Rogers
King held that Edwin had made his confessions repeatedly, and volunta-
rily, and that the only constraint upon him was that necessary "for his
safe custody.' 128 Nelson's case was different. He confessed to the over-
seer, who was the owner's son, while he "was in the stocks" and after the
son declared that "it would be better for him to tell what he had
done."' 129 The court was not disturbed by the fact that Nelson was in
stocks. This did not "authorize the conclusion that, threats or violence
were used to extort confessions."' 130 He was in stocks "only for safekeep-
ing." a 1 The problem concerned the remark made by the overseer. The
confession to him came "strictly within the rules which should have ex-
cluded it from evidence. It was made to his young master ... to whose
authority he habitually submitted, to whom he would naturally look for
protection.., the admonition coming from such a source was well calcu-
lated to inspire the slave with the hope of protection from the conse-
quences of his act if fully confessed," and it should have been
excluded. 132
An Alabama court reached a similar conclusion in an arson case
against the slave Wyatt. Chief Justice William P. Chilton did not con-
126. Id. at 547.
127. Id. at 548.
128. State v. Nelson, 3 La. Ann. 497, 500 (1848).
129. Id. at 499.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 500.
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tend that all confessions made to masters by slaves should be excluded,
but he did argue that the court should examine
with caution, whether the confessions of guilt made by a slave in inter-
views had with his master, or one having dominion over him, were not
elicited or controlled by the relation, and predicated upon the fear of
punishment or injury, or upon the hope of some benefit to be gained by
making them.1
33
The Alabama court ruled the confession to the master in this case was
not voluntary, and should have been thrown out.' 34 A final example
should do. It was an arson case, Simon v. State.135 In this case Simon
was examined by the Mayor of Pensacola who told him that if he had
burned the house "he would be put upon his trial and would be certainly
hung; that if he had any accomplices he would, by testifying against
them, become State's evidence, and they would be put upon their trial
and not him."' 136 The mayor noted that there was a loud crowd outside
and that they said the prisoner should be hung. Simon asked for his
master to whom he would tell the whole truth. He confessed. According
to his master he "was under a great state of excitement ... was laboring
under great terror, and . . .he never saw any one more terrified."' 137
Judge Raphael Semmes, for the majority of the Florida court, ruled this
and subsequent confessions inadmissible. "Independent of these confes-
sions," Semmes wrote, the fact that the accused was a slave who had
confessed to his master was "entitled to the most grave consideration; the
ease with which this class of our population can be intimidated, and the
almost absolute control which the owner ... [has] over the will of the
slave, should induce the courts at all times to receive their confessions
with the utmost caution and distrust."' 38
A major exception to this line of cases came in Mississippi in 1857 in
Sam v. State.'39 Sam's owner had captured his slave, "chained his legs
together, and brought him home in the stage-coach." He asked him why
he burned the gin house, and Sam allegedly replied because he "wished
to be hung." Judge Alexander Handy, for the court, upheld the convic-
tion based in part on the confession. His reasoning was that "[t]he rela-
tion which the slave bears to the master, is certainly one of dependence
and obedience, but it is not necessarily one of constraint and duress."
133. Wyatt v. State, 25 Ala. 9, 14-15 (1854).
134. Id. at 12.
135. 5 Fla. 285 (1853).
136. Id. at 286-87.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 296.
139. 33 Miss. 347 (Ct. Err. & App. 1857).
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Patriarchalism had a severe price, not the least of which was this charac-
terization of the master-slave relationship. "It is not to be presumed,"
Handy continued, "that the master exercises an undue influence over his
slave to induce him to make confessions tending to convict him of a capi-
tal offence, because besides the feelings of justice and humanity, which
would forbid such efforts, it would be against the interest of the master
that the slave should make confessions which would forfeit his life; for he
would thereby sustain a loss to the amount of one-half of the value of the
slave." 140 It would be extremely dangerous to exclude the confessions of
slaves to masters:
Such confessions are not incompetent upon any sound legal principle;
and to establish the rule that they are incompetent, would be highly
impolitic and dangerous; because, from the nature of the connection
between master and slave, if confessions fully made to him should not
be admissible, they would not be likely to be made to any others; and
thus, however true the confessions, and however strongly corroborated
by circumstances, all violations of law committed by slaves, the proof
of which depended on that sort of evidence, would go unpunished in
the courts of justice. And the consequence of this would be, that a
disposition would be created to punish slaves, otherwise than accord-
ing to the rules and restraints of the law, which should operate, both in
its protection and in its punishments, upon them, as well as upon white
man. 
14 1
Obviously, a different legal problem was presented when slaves
"confessed" to the murder of those with direct authority over them.
Now the significance of subordination or deference to those to whom
confessions were given became murky. All of the appellate cases in
which the problem was considered arose after 1850. That the issue arose
at all and when it did reflected a heightened concern on the part of
Southern jurists with fairness in slave trials.
One of the first cases in which the problem was considered was Al-
fred v. State, a Tennessee case decided in 1853. The court upheld the
convictions of the slaves for the murder of their master despite objections
to the admissibility of certain evidence. Under the law of Tennessee a
magistrate before whom defendants were brought was to "record the ex-
amination of the party" and transmit the written record to the trial
court. It appears that there was a confession made by each slave other
than to the committing magistrate. These confessions, the court noted,
"were attended by such circumstances as to render them incompe-
tent."' 142 The lower court had held them to be so, but permitted them to
140. Id. at 351.
141. Id. at 351-52.
142. 32 Tenn. (2 Swan) 581 (1853).
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go to the jury. But the real question for the appellate court concerned
the confessions taken by the magistrate. These were "competent." The
court argued that if a defendant "be cautioned by the magistrate that
whatever he may say may be used against him, and that he is not bound
to criminate himself, but that it is his privilege to submit to an examina-
tion or not, at his option, there certainly can be no good reason why any
statements or confessions he may make under such circumstances should
not be good evidence against him."1 43 Slaves possessed a right against
self-incrimination, and were to be warned by a committing magistrate of
this right.'" At least they possessed the right in the abstract.
Three years later the Georgia court confronted this problem in Rafe
v. State. 145 The slave Rafe confessed to the sheriff of Liberty County,
who was bringing Rafe back from Savannah. On the way back the sheriff
met others, and an interrogation followed. During the course of it the
sheriff told Rafe that the people of the county believed he had killed his
master. The sheriff then said that "if he did do it he had better acknowl-
edge it, but if he did not do it not to acknowledge it; that if he lied, it
would be adding sin to sin; that the people of Liberty were so satisfied he
did it they would hang him any how." 146 After that Rafe confessed, but
as the sheriff put it, "Prisoner has confessed and denied several times
since to me and others." 147 The court ruled the confessions admissible
since they were "not elicited by promises or threats; and although they
may have been induced by the remarks and interrogation of the Sheriff,
the record shows that they were voluntarily made."' 14 The court,
through Judge Charles J. McDonald, hastened to add that it disapproved
"of the manner in which they were obtained-spiritual exhortations had
better be left to the clergy."1 49
143. Id. at 589-90.
144. Id. One case that emptied this right of any significance was Seaborn v. State, 20 Ala. 15
(1852). Justice Chilton remarked about the confessions that they "were made to the examining
magistrate, who did not previously caution them, as he undoubtedly ought to have done, as to the
effect of such admissions, would not justify the court in excluding them. We find no case excluding
confessions for want of such caution." Id. at 18.
145. 20. Ga. 60 (1856).
146. Id. at 62. See also Mose v. State 36 Ala. 211 (1860). Mose had confessed to the murder of
a white man to two separate men, and one condition that preceded the confessions had been that he
had been handed over to a "vigilance committee" some of whom suggested that they collect a fund
to pay for him, and execute him themselves. On this aspect of the case Chief Justice A.J. Walker
commented as follows: "His confessions seem to have been prompted by a sense of religious duty,
awakened by the apprehension of a speedy execution at the hands of lawless violence, and were not
the result of the slightest hope of temporal benefit on account of the confession." Id. at 228. They
were held admissible.
147. Rafe, 20 Ga. at 63.
148. Id. at 68.
149. Id.
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That same year the Mississippi high court also ruled on an impor-
tant confessions case, Dick v. State. 150 This case involved the confessions
made to white persons who did not have authority over the slave as
either magistrate or master. The slaves were found guilty of the murder
of their master who they allegedly had choked to death. Counsel for the
slaves made a bold effort to invalidate their confessions. They had come
late in the evening after some whites had been with the slaves all day, and
it was not until there were about eighteen to twenty whites surrounding
them, and after they were arrested, chained, and told to confess that they
did so. "The man who is born a slave, raised a slave, and knows, and
feels his destiny and lot is to die a slave," counsel argued, "always under
a superior, controlling his actions and his will, cannot be supposed to act
or speak voluntarily and of his free will, while surrounded by fifteen or
twenty of those to whom he knows he is subservient, and by the law
bound to obey."' 51 He continued that,
[s]uch a being, in his physical, moral, and intellectual faculties, is, and
must ever be, more or less subservient to the will and wishes of the
freeman having the control over him; and when in chains, and in-
formed that it would be better for him to confess, is under duress.
Place man physically and morally, in perpetual slavery, and how can
the intellectual man be free? Perpetual slavery and free will are incom-
patible with each other. 152
Cobb agreed, but then so did Rousseau. 53  Precisely because of their
social status the confessions of slaves should always be suspect, and to
the point of total exclusion.
The Mississippi court, however, did not rise to this challenge, any-
more than it would a year later in Sam's case. It focused on the fact that
the confessions were not made before an officer during a judicial exami-
nation. It admitted that "[n]o warning of any kind whatever, was given
to the prisoners of their rights-and that they were not bound to make
any confession, by which they would criminate themselves."' t5 4 But, this
150. 30 Miss. 593 (1856).
151. Id. at 595.
152. Id.
153. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURsES 5 (G.D.H. Cole
trans., 1968): Rousseau argued that:
Artistotle was right: but he took the effect for the cause. Nothing can be more certain than
that every man born in slavery is born for slavery. Slaves lose everything in their chains,
even the desire of escaping from them: they love their servitude, as the comrades of Ulysses
loved their brutish condition. If then there are slaves by nature, it is because there have
been slaves against nature. Force made the first slaves, and their cowardice perpetuated
the condition.
Id.
154. Dick, 30 Miss. at 598. Two cases in which confessions were thrown out because they were
obtained by violence inflicted by third-parties who were not magistrates were Jordan v. State, 32
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was a right that existed only in the context of an official examination. As
long as no effort was made by private parties to induce the slaves to con-
fess by "threats or promises" the confessions would be held to be "per-
fectly voluntary." 155 Subordination, even to all whites, did not preclude
"voluntariness" in Southern courts. The court, of course, did not discuss
the notion that from the point of view of slaves all whites were persons in
"authority." This was a question of considerable significance. Goodell,
for instance, cited a number of Southern statutes to show that slaves were
held to be in subjection to all white persons. 156 And the South Carolina
Supreme Court held in Ex parte Boylston 157 that it was a criminal of-
fense, triable in a magistrate-freeholders court, for a slave to be insolent
to a white. Would not such a view of the relationship between slaves and
all whites necessarily raise a serious question about the "voluntariness"
of any confession given by a slave to any white? And, would that not in
turn bring us back to the notion that because of the "ignominy of the
soul" that flowed out of social degradation the testimony of slaves, in-
cluding their confessions, should be excluded?
Mark Tushnet has suggested that courts began to recognize that co-
erciveness was essential in the master-slave relationship, and this was
"ultimately subversive of the general rule of voluntariness."' 58 The rule
could be preserved only if it were preserved for third parties, "particu-
larly representatives of the state," who were independent of the master
class. This proved impossible, in Tushnet's view, because "of the threat
to public order and self-conception"' 5 9 that a special slave law created. I
agree up to a point. But this view overlooks the significance of race. It
was impossible to completely preserve "voluntariness," not solely be-
cause of the threat to public order-and that was genuine-but also be-
cause whites in general were not always conceptually separated from the
"master-class." Slaves were considered to be subordinate to all whites,
and, therefore, voluntariness could not have been preserved even for
third-parties. But this would not necessarily mean that all confessions
had to be excluded from evidence, even though that was one strong an-
swer. Another might have been to admit all confessions, and leave it to
the court or jury to give them what weight they deserved in the circum-
Miss. 382, 386-88 (Ct. Err. & App. 1856); and Simon v. State, 37 Miss. 288 (Ct. Err. & App. 1859).
Both cases involved the killing of slaves rather than whites.
155. Id. at 598.
156. GOODELL, supra note 2, at 305-08.
157. 33 S.C.L. (3 Rich.) 41, 44-45 (1847).
158. TUSHNET, supra note 119, at 127.
159. Id. at 137-38.
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stances. This was the approach of Scottish law, as Tushnet noted, 160 and
was applauded by Chief Justice Joseph Henry Lumpkin, an opponent of
legal technicality, in Stephen v. State. 61 This would have amounted to
treating slave confessions in a fashion similar to slave testimony in gen-
eral in the West Indies in the eighteenth century. It was ultimately a
matter of policy, and Southern whites had always shown themselves to
be quite supple about such matters. Nonetheless, in this case it seems
likely that the weight of legal traditions and learned practice blunted any
widespread move toward the Scottish solution.
CONCLUSION
Legal traditions, religious values, the imperatives of social subordi-
nation, racism and even property interests then could determine whether
a person would be admitted as a witness in a criminal case, and they
could determine the way evidence was weighed if it were received. But
this was contingent. Down to the 1720s slaves generally were excluded
from Southern courts, except in noncapital cases, with the possible ex-
ception of South Carolina. Fear of the violent resistance of the slaves
compelled the admission of their testimony, even though with conditions
and restraints. As in the West Indies, the testimony would be accepted,
but the weight of it was for the triers of fact to determine, and it had to
be corroborated, at least in capital cases. For slaves, law was more often
the rules of the plantation, or even their own norms and sanctions. As
Judge David Wardlaw of South Carolina observed in a leading slave in-
solence case, the law as to slaves was but "a compact between his rulers"
with which the slaves had nothing to do.' 62 On occasion this meant,
especially before the 1720s, that some slave "crime" was not punishable
in the public courts of the South. It was a price Southern whites paid for
refusing to allow the testimony of pagan blacks. Slaves then existed in a
sort of limbo, the abode of souls barred from heaven because of not hav-
ing received Christian baptism. They were also barred from Southern
courts at times, and existed only in the shadows of the legal order. It was
fear of violent resistance coming from those shadows that finally over-
came legal traditions derived from England.
As the Civil War approached there was evidence that the testimony
of slaves would be taken more seriously, either by being taken under
oath, or by being allowed without the requirement that it be corrobo-
160. Id.
161. 11 Ga. 225, 235 (1852).
162. Ex parte Boylston, 33 S.C.L. (3 Rich.) 41, 43 (1847).
[Vol. 68:1209
SLAVES AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
rated by pregnant circumstances. This was another dimension of the fact
that slaves were increasingly drawn into the normal criminal justice sys-
tem.' 63 The end result of this line of legal development could have cut
very deeply into the claims and prerogatives of masters, a result with
very serious consequences. In the face of such developments and threats
Southern whites erected ideological defenses of their social order, 164 and
this brought to the fore the problem of social subordination. This, in
turn, raised serious questions about slave confessions, questions that had
never been openly asked or considered before.
Forced to confront a relationship that ultimately rested upon the
whip, by the nineteenth century some argued that confessions of slaves to
masters were suspect and ought to be wholly excluded. The logic of this
position could not have been kept within bounds since Southern whites
argued that black slaves were to show deference to all whites. There was
no principled way to limit the analysis as long as the slave system was
inextricably tied in Southern white discourse with the problem of race.
The result could have been a swing back to the medieval view that had
excluded the evidence of villeins. This, however, was in tension with the
modern legal developments whereby slaves were granted more and more
procedural rights in Southern courts, including such legal securities as
the right to a jury trial, the right to counsel, and the right to an appeal. 65
There clearly were contradictory tendencies at work in Southern
criminal law as it applied to slaves, and there was no inevitable resolution
of the tensions. The resolution came as a result of the blood-bath that
began in 1861, but it was far from certain before that. One thing, how-
ever, was certain. Rules of evidence-rules fashioned to control juries
and lawyers-were also constructed to assure the property interests of
slave-owners, and the domination of whites over blacks. Some of the
rules of evidence might have been even-handed for those who possessed
property, or at least who were entitled to acquire it, but generally those
examined here would never be fair for persons of color, and especially for
those who were held as property. There had even been times when slaves
were not only unprotected at law-they were not even admitted to the
163. DANIEL J. FLANIGAN, CRIMINAL LAW OF SLAVERY AND FREEDOM (1973).
164. There has been superb work on the proslavery argument, and some excellent collections.
One of the more controversial among the former is LARRY E. TISE, PROSLAVERY: A HISTORY OF
THE DEFENSE OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA, 1701-1840 (1987). He grounds many of the significant
proslavery arguments in the conservative political philosophy of New England Federalism, and the
conservative theology of New England congregationalism. Id. at 232-37. An excellent collection of
primary materials is FAUST, supra note 11.
165. The relevant statutory extensions can be followed conveniently in 2 JOHN C. HURD, THE
LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 2-200 (1858).
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mysteries of the criminal side of the legal order, unless the case were
minor, or they confessed. As Cobb had observed, law was for the "othes-
worth," 166 and that meant it was for the free.
166. 1 COBB, supra note 1, at 227-29.
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